In 2001 a number of Colombian municipalities were entrusted with the responsibility to administer and operate the public education service on their territories. The delegation of responsibilities and related financial transfers was decided solely on the basis of whether each city exceeded the 100 thousand inhabitants threshold. Exploiting this discontinuity, in this paper I look at the heterogeneous impact that autonomy as had on student test scores across different municipalities, depending on the level of local development at the time of responsibility takeover. The identification strategies employed are regression discontinuity and fixed-effects on a discontinuity sample. I find a test score gap arising between municipalities in the top quartile and those in the bottom quartile of the development range, in a trend that seems to be reinforcing over time. From analysis of detailed municipal balance sheet data, it emerges that the top-quartile municipalities entrusted with autonomy invest in education more than the ad hoc transfers they receive, integrating these with own financial resources, while low-developed cities only spend the transfers they receive.
Introduction
Decentralization of public service provision has been on top of policy agendas in numerous countries over the last decades. Education, health, public transport and the supply of energy, water and sewerage systems are the most frequently discussed areas. In developing and middle-income countries, the most common type of reform handles responsibilities from the central or regional down to the municipal level 1 . The arguments traditionally backing reforms that shift responsibilities to lower levels of government are better local preference matching 2 and expected increases in effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of services 3 . Possible downsides of decentralizing public service provision are unpreparedness of local authorities for an efficient management their new duties, excessive increases in administrative and coordination costs, and corruption among local bureaucrats or local elites capturing resource transfers.
As a matter of fact, the aftermath of a decentralization reform incorporates all of the above elements, and the overall or net result will display heterogeneity across local authorities, depending on their respective local characteristics. In this paper I show that entrusting Colombian municipalities with autonomy over local public education, and with the associated financial resource transfers, has yielded heterogeneous results across cities, depending on their level of development at the time of the responsibility takeover. In this analysis I benefit of an unusually clean decentralization reform setup: autonomy over the education service was assigned to cities solely depending on whether these were exceeding the 100 thousand inhabitants threshold. This decision rule relieves the analysis from the issues that typically hinder identification of the effects of a decentralization reform: local authorities selecting into autonomy in ways correlated with their outcomes, and nationwide phenomena occurring simultaneously with the reform interfering with outcomes.
Using municipal-level panel data on standardized student test scores over a period of 10 years after the reform, I find a gap opening between the performance of the highest-developed and the lowestdeveloped quartiles of municipalities. The test score gap is sizable in magnitude and appears to be widening over the years. If we consider student performance as a measure of education quality, the resulting claim is that cities characterized by high development indicators have drawn benefit from autonomy over education, while the same has not been true for cities with low development indicators. Development indicators summarize local life quality, poverty shares and financial conditions, so that 'highly developed' cities typically enjoy wealthier population, higher tax bases and higher amounts of own financial resources.
1 recent examples are the experiences of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia in Latin America; India, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines in Southeast Asia; South Africa, Senegal, Ethiopia and Uganda in Africa; Ukraine, Serbia and Bulgaria in Eastern Europe 2 Local authorities are deemed better able to identify and serve needs which are specific to their territory 3 Usually through the channel of greater accountability and tighter monitoring of local authorities by local communities Exploring municipal balance sheet data I show that, on average, high and low developed municipalities concretize their autonomy into different spending behaviors. Municipalities in the upper development quartile invest not only the education transfers that they receive from the government, but they also add own financial resources to reach their final per-pupil education budget. On the contrary, municipalities in the lower development quartile only spend the resources they receive from the central government.
If we think of a model in which the legislator tries to incentivize local authorities' performance by increasing their responsibility and accountability, in this paper I show that the intended mechanism may only work for those local authorities who face favorable structural conditions, and instead penalize those who face adverse conditions. As a consequence, a decentralization reform that does not properly account for structural differences across local authorities may result in widening local inequalities across the national territory.
Decentralization and Colombian Decentralization
Seminal work on the outcomes of decentralization includes models by Musgrave [1959] and Oates [1972] , who study the conditions under which heterogeneity of local preferences and informational advantage can lead local governments to achieve higher allocative efficiency with respect to the central state. In a different research strand, the drivers of decentralization outcomes are accountability, monitoring and democratic elections, as in Crook and Manor [1998] , Manor [1999] and Blair [2000] . Breton and Scott [1978] are frontrunners in the literature focusing on the tradeoff faced by a decentralized system, namely decreased preference signaling costs but increased administrative and organizational costs (also see Panizza [2004] ). Tiebout [1956] and Breton [1996] are leading references in the research on the competition dynamics being triggered among local authorities following decentralization, and on the subsequent impact on service delivery.
Heterogeneity in the effects of decentralization is modeled by Mookherjee [2005, 2006] , who show how the combination of strong local elites and weak local institutions implies decentralization to yield under-provision of services to the local poor. Diversity of impacts across places and people are discussed also by Kaiser [2006] , and with a special focus on developing countries, by Juetting et al. [2005] , who conclude failing to establish any clear link between decentralization and poverty reduction. In an empirical study looking at the U.S., Hammond and Tosun [2011] find that fiscal decentralization led to gains in employment and economic growth for metropolitan counties but insignificant to negative impacts for non-metropolitan ones. In terms of contest, focus and findings, closest to this paper are Galiani et al. [2008] , who find that transferring Argentinian schools from a central to a provincial management yielded positive results in terms of test scores, but only for schools located in non-poor municipalities.
Starting in the 1980s, Colombia has been undergoing a gradual decentralization process involving governance and administration, fiscal structure, and the delivery of public services. The reform in 2001 redefined local authorities' responsibilities and funding toward the delivery of public services.
Various authors have looked at the outcomes of these processes, some in a qualitative and some in a quantitative fashion. Keeping the focus on education, Borjas and Acosta [2000] , Vergara and Simpson [2001] and Caballero [2006] comprehensively illustrate dynamics and outcomes of decentralizing the public education system over the nineties, agreeing on generally undistinguished results. Sanchez [2008, 2014] look at municipalities' balance sheet data and construct original aggregate measures of decentralization, then finding lower dependence on central government transfers to be associated with higher expenditure on education and positive effects on public school enrollment rates. Closing in on the topic of this paper, educational outcomes of the 2001 reform are explored in the Colombian central bank report by Lonzano et al. [2007] , who conclude that the post-reform years have witnessed progress in attendance rates but disappointing results in terms of quality and efficiency. Also Cortés [2010] focuses on the 2001 reform, uses enrollment data up to 2006 and compares municipalities who gained education autonomy to the remaining, finding that the former significantly increased enrollments of publicly subsidized pupils into private schools.
The 2001 Reform

Reform context and motivations
Colombia is currently structured into local authorities as follows: there are 32 departments, which are the equivalent of "regions" or "states" in other countries; 1,118 municipalities, each belonging to one department; 4 special districts (see maps in Section 9 Appendix). Local authorities enjoy decisional and spending autonomy over a wide range of matters, although the necessary financial resources mostly consist of central government transfers, deriving from national tax revenues. In fact, Colombia is considered among the administratively most decentralized countries in Latin America, but is fiscally very centralized (Alesina et al. [2000] ; Toro [2006] ). Up to the 2001 reform, departments and municipalities were jointly in charge of the education service, and both were entitled to hire personnel and invest in infrastructure and equipment 4 . Being the direct recipients of most of the transfers for education 5 , departments had a strong leverage on the education sector, but the division of responsibilities over the management of public education was vague and far from transparent (Borjas and Acosta [2000] ). The elimination of such responsibility overlaps for the sake of accountability was one of the main goals of the 2001 reform. Further goals were improving efficiency and reducing waste 4 Law 60 / 1993 (distributing competencies across levels of government and assigning resources accordingly), Law 115 / 1994 (the 'comprehensive education act'), and respective follow-up decrees.
5 See Table 1 in the use of public resources, eliminating the year-to-year fluctuations in the transfers reaching local authorities (see fn. ??), and updating obsolete distribution criteria of financial resources 6 .
Reform content
The enactment of Law 715/2001 implied two fundamental changes for the local management and financing of public education. The first fundamental change was the clear-cut allocation of responsibility over local education to either municipalities or departments. Municipalities that in 2002 counted 100 thousand or more inhabitants would become "certified in education", meaning responsible for the public education service on their territories. I will refer to these as 'certified municipalities' from now onwards. Municipalities with less than 100 thousand inhabitants would not be certified, and public education on their territory would be run by the departments they belong to. The next subsection further clarifies the concept of autonomy in the management of education. The second change that the 2001 reform introduced was a revision of the formulas that the central government uses to compute the yearly transfers for local authorities to run public services, including education.
As mentioned before, the rationale for this change was to detach the transfers from the year-to-year variability of central government income, and to amend out of date resource distribution criteria.
Section ?? provides further details regarding resource transfers.
The 2001 reform affected not only the education service, but also the provision of healthcare, water and sewerage and other smaller public services. Nonetheless, it was only for the education sector that this reform separated municipalities into autonomous and not, and used the 100 thousand inhabitants rule. For the remaining sectors, only the transfer formulas were updated and no changes in autonomy occurred.
Coming back to education, the reformed assigned certification to forty municipalities in 2001. These cities account for around one third of Colombia's population and pupil share; their size ranges from 105 thousand to over 2 million inhabitants (see their locations in panel c), Section 9 Appendix).
From the year 2002 included and onwards, the certification concept was applied and transfers for education flew accordingly -to departments and to certified municipalities. The reform provided for a transition period of two years (2002 and 2003) , during which certified local authorities took over the school infrastructure, started the effective management of the service, and had the opportunity to reorganize staffing plans on their territories. During these two years temporary transfer amounts were set, and from 2004 onwards the new transfer system became fully operational.
Local authorities' competencies and transfers before and after the reform
The type of administrative decentralization this paper deals with is what established literature sometimes labels as 'devolution', referring to situations in which the activities of subnational units of government are substantially outside the direct control of the central government [Rondinelli et al., 1983] . Table 1 summarizes competencies of local authorities before and after the 2001 reform, and indicates percentages of education transfers flowing to their treasuries.
Central government transfers have historically been accounting for around 90% of the total education expenditure (on average nationwide), and the remaining 10% is contributed by departments' and municipalities' own resources in approximately equal proportion, with some local variability in these figures (Borjas and Acosta, 2000, p.6; Iregui B. et al., 2006, p.31; Santa Maria S. et al., 2009, pp.19-20) .
Up to 2001, municipalities theoretically had education competencies comparable to the ones of departments and to certified municipalities post-reform. In practice though, the competency overlap with departments and the fact that departments were recipients of the bulk of transfers produced municipalities de facto quite restrained in their decisions (DDTS [2004] report, p.6). Emblematically, departments were hiring 85%-90% of all teachers and thus having the final word on their placements across the territory ([Corte Constitucional, 1997, par.16 ]. Table 1 , the transfer distribution was modified by the reform, diverting resources directly into certified-municipalities (away from departments) and away from non-certified municipalities (into departments). As a result, certified municipalities draw and manage 100% of their share of education transfers, while departments draw the shares for non-certified municipalities 7 .
As illustrated in
The reform also brought an adjustment in the allocation formulas of education resources. In broad outlines, up to 2001 the vast majority of transfers were assigned based on number and seniority of teachers employed, with some adjustment based on number of inhabitants, local poverty and administrative efficiency. From 2002 onwards the allocation criteria were tilted towards a student headcount base, but with number of teachers still playing a key role, and again with some adjustment for local poverty and population density. These changes applied to transfers to all local authorities, certified and not, and if number of teachers and students do not exhibit discontinuities at the 100 thousand inhabitants threshold there is no reason for which these changes in allocation formulas would constitute a confounder in the identification of the effect of local autonomy.
Both before and after the reform, transfers are meant to be exclusively used for the service to which they are dedicated, administered in separate accounts and thus not fungible with respect to the remaining revenues and expenses of the local authority [MEN, 2003] . 3.4 Further relevant aspects
Population and population cutoff
The population figures that were used for the 2001 reform were issued by the National Statistics Office (DANE) and were not prepared ad hoc for the event but issued as forward projections on the occasion of the 1993 general census. Certification was assigned to those municipalities that according to the projections for the year 2002 were exceeding 100 thousand inhabitants. The cutoff was sharply implemented, and no exceptions were made in either direction. The way population counts arose sets aside any potential suspicion about manipulation towards the reform.
The 100 thousand inhabitant cutoff is not used for any other norm involving municipal freedom in public service provision. Every fiscal year municipalities are classified into categories according to their current revenues and inhabitant count, and 100thousand inhabitants is the lower bound of the 'first' category 8 . This categorization is updated every year and is used for setting limits to salaries of the mayor, of council members and administrative staff and limits to general administrative expenditures; the changes are minor across category thresholds. The smaller municipalities (categories fourth to sixth) are entitled to special support transfers. Figure 7 shows smoothness of various municipal characteristics around 100 thousand inhabitants. Most notably, student test scores just before the reform (in 2001) do not exhibit discontinuities at the 2002 treatment cutoffand if one considers test scores as summary statistics that reflect a range of underlying municipal characteristics, and especially those concerning education, this injects further confidence about the absence of any relevant transitions occurring at 100 thousand inhabitants.
Districts and special municipalities
There are two municipalities (Armenia and Pasto) who were formally 'certified in education' already in 1999-2000, even though it is unclear whether their freedoms during the period before 2002 were comparable to the post-reform ones. I exclude these two cities from the analysis.
The reform provided for further cities to be certified in the future, conditional on satisfying a list of attributes proving readiness for autonomy. In 2008 two further municipalities acquired certification, and fourteen more did in 2010. In this second wave of certification, obtaining autonomy is likely to be correlated with municipality characteristics other than population. For this reason, I exclude the years 2011 and 2012 in a robustness check on the main test score results (Table ? ? in Section ?? in the Appendix), but these are does not affected.
Districts are local authorities whose nature is mixed between departments and municipalities. Even before 2002 they were drawing the totality of their education allocation directly into their treasuries, without intermediation of a department. The four Colombian districts are Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta, and they are excluded from the analysis.
Data
Test scores
Colombia has a long running tradition of standardized testing in public and private schools; ICFES is the government agency in charge of conducting and assessing the tests across the whole country. The most complete and frequent test score data refers to the Saber11 examination, which is administered to all students completing high school 9 , and which is widely accepted as the reference examination to evaluate the quality of Colombian secondary education. Saber11 evaluates a range of school subjects;
test scores range from 0 to 100 in each subject and are standardized by subject at the national level, to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. This is, each student's score is informative about his/her position relative to the national average in that subject. Individual-level Saber11 test scores are made available by ICFES for the years 2000 to 2012, with information about the school and municipality to which each student belongs, and some information student background.
Municipal Development Measures
The development level of Colombian municipalities is being evaluated periodically, data being col- The Appendix shows results obtained using a different and also well established development indicator, the Unsatisfied Basic Needs indicator (hereafter UBN 11 ). The UBN indicator ranges from 0 to 100 and expresses the percentage of municipal inhabitants experiencing at least one 'unsatisfied basic need' among the categories of living standards, access to education and economic situation of the household; the lower index value, the better. The Colombian UBN index is computed at every general census; the most recent pre-reform measurement occurred in 1993; the UBN of later certified municipalities then ranged from 9 to 71. Results obtained using the UBN indicator as a development proxy are consistent both qualitatively and quantitatively with those obtained using the MDI index.
Empirical framework
The aim is to identify the impact of municipal-level autonomy over the management of local education on student test scores, taken as a proxy for educational quality. Beyond looking at the average effect, the following sections will seek to pinpoint heterogeneous patterns underlying that average.
With previous decentralization literature in mind, attention will be focused on heterogeneity in the effects of autonomy across different levels of municipal development and poverty, as defined in the previous section. The next subsections first introduce and then discuss the two identification strategies adopted.
Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
The fact that in 2001 certification was assigned solely on the basis of the 100 thousand municipal population cutoff sets the conditions for a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design. The subsequent methodological summary draws on the excellent outlines by Imbens and Lemieux [2008] and Pettersson-Lidbom [2008] , to which I refer for a more detailed discussion of the RD methodology.
Consider the equation
represents average test scores in municipality i and C i is a dummy signaling whether municipality i was certified in education (C i = 1) or not (C i = 0). The consistent estimation of the treatment effect τ is hindered by the fact that most likely certification C i is correlated with other municipal characteristics enclosed in i . In our setup though, we know that the sole assignment rule for C i was population count P i , and specifically whether P i exceeded c = 100 000 or not, such that
In this case we have that conditioning on population P i will remove any correlation between C i and i , so that treatment C i is as good as randomly assigned conditional on P i 12 . Thus the ideal specification of a 'control function' h (P i ) is such that its insertion into our equation (I) will completely purge it from any dependence between C i and i [Heckman and Robb, 1985] . In practice it is difficult to guess the ideal functional form of h (P i ) and thus a common approach is to use flexible functions such as high order polynomials of P i 13 . In order to ensure that τ is capturing only the effect of the treatment, we also need all other characteristics of the observed units not to change discontinuously at the treatment cutoff. In our case, we need municipal characteristics other than certification in education not to exhibit 'jumps' at 100 thousand inhabitants, otherwise we would not know which part of the estimated effect on test scores is due to certification and which part is due to the other changes happening at 100 thousand inhabitants. Smoothness of municipal characteristics was discussed in section 3.4.1, and further evidence on pre-reform smoothness of test scores is given through the falsification tests in section 12. I estimate the model
where f (P i ) is approximated by a third oder polynomial in P i , and interpret τ RD as the average treatment effect of certification in education. I then introduce the municipal development variable D i , expressing the MDI indicator illustrated in section 4.2. Heterogeneity across levels of local development can be explored either by applying 1 to different subsamples, or by introducing an interaction term between certification and development, obtaining
where τ RD 0 +τ RD 1 D i can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of certification at development level D i . Section 6 shows the estimation results of 1 on the full sample of municipalities and on four subsamples split by development (upper half and lower half, highest quartile and lowest quartile), and the estimation results of 2.
Regression discontinuity designs are notably data demanding and rarely free of obstacles (more on this in the discussion section 5.3). The fact that only forty cities obtained certification in 2002 and that their population sizes are not all clustered at 100 thousand inhabitants poses difficulties in terms of available sample size and precision. I am able to reduce noise by using ten post-reform years of data (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , so that the outcomes of every municipality are observed multiple times and thus sampling variance is reduced. Including year fixed effects is not necessary in this setup as the test score outcomes are standardized each year according to the yearly national performance.
Further discussion of the RD estimation here implemented is postponed to Section 5.3.
Fixed Effect Regression on a Discontinuity Sample
An alternative method for estimating the average treatment treatment effect of certification in education on student test scores is applying the fixed effects (FE) concept. Instead of estimating regression or other nonparametric methods. In a recent working paper, Gelman and Imbens [2014] recommend to prefer the latter group to the global polynomial method I employ here. These methods are data thirsty and require high numbers of observations close to the boundary, a luxury that is unavailable in this setting.
the treatment effect out of essentially comparing certified municipalities to non-certified ones, like in the RD setting, with the fixed effects method I estimate the effect out of over-time variation in the performance of municipalities that acquire certification. The basic FE model reads as follows:
where test scores in municipality i and year t,Y it , are regressed on certification status C it , which takes value 1 in years from 2002 onwards for municipalities who obtained certification, and is 0 otherwise. Municipality fixed effects are M i and time fixed effects are T t ; the effect of certification is captured by τ F E .
I limit the sample to municipalities with a number of inhabitants close to the certification cutoff, both from the left and from the right, in order to avoid confounders such as municipal characteristics varying with population size to threaten identification. Following Angrist and Lavy [1999] , I refer to this as our 'discontinuity sample'. We are thus estimating 3 on a sample of cities that are similar to each other in size, out of which some acquired education autonomy (C = 1) in 2002 and some did not. Since autonomy was assigned solely on the base of size, we can consider autonomy as good as randomly assigned within the discontinuity sample.
For the main specification in the empirical analysis I use municipalities between 80 thousand and 130 thousand inhabitants -which results in a sample of thirty cities, eleven of which acquired certification in 2002 and nineteen did not 14 , and whose population counts and development indices are illustrated in Figure 1 with dark bars and light bars respectively 15 . Table 2 shows some relevant summary statistics separately for certified and non-certified municipalities, and highlights the similarity of the two groups in terms of pre-reform characteristics -including pre-reform test score levels.
The thirty cities in the discontinuity sample account for about 8.35% of the student population enrolled in primary and secondary school in 2012: 5% in the nineteen non-certified municipalities and 3.35% in the eleven certified ones 16 .
In order to pursue our goal of identifying heterogeneity in the effects of autonomy by levels of local development, model 3 is augmented with an interaction term between certification status C it and development measure D i , obtaining
14 Results are robust to extending or restricting the sample; regressions on different samples are presented in Table  ? ? in the Appendix.
15 Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the two distributions for a wider range of municipalities. where the effect of certification at development level D i will be given by the estimates of τ F E 0 +τ F E 1 D i . Section 6 shows results of this fixed effects approach.
Discussion of identification
The two identification strategies adopted rely on two different types of variation: variation between outcomes of different cities for the RD strategy, and variation in the outcomes of the same city over time for the FE strategy. As we will see in the next sections, the two approaches yield conclusions about test score outcomes which are qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar. Even though each of the two approaches may be subject to its own caveats, the fact that they endorse each other's results reassures on the reliability of these. In the next paragraphs I am going to briefly discuss some of these caveats.
As anticipated in section 5.1, the probably most salient difficulty of applying the RD methodology to the context of this paper is the limited sample size available, which exposes the analysis to both low power and potentially excessive small sample variation. In fact the confidence levels at which the null is being rejected in the result section are not particularly impressive 17 . Moreover, also cities distant from the treatment cutoff are used for estimation of the RD model 18 , which is not a problem as long as the population polynomial f (P i ) is able to 'control' for those municipal characteristics that vary with size and may confound the effect of autonomy on test scores. The less one needs to move away from the cutoff (the larger the sample close to the cutoff), the more likely it is that such confounders are properly eliminated. Despite these drawbacks, results display a fairly stable path across subsamples and are robust to different specifications (see section 14.1) and, beyond the consistency with FE results, backing the conclusions there are the subsequent findings in terms of channels of the effect.
The change in the formulas through which the amounts of central government transfers are computed, which happened in conjunction with the change in autonomy levels, might at first sound worrisome.
In fact though, the changes in formulas affected all municipalities in the same way and not only one group or the other. The identification through RD strategy should thus remain largely unaffected 17 The limited amount of available data points also prescribes parsimony in the number of model parameters to estimate. The parsimonious regression model 1 is therefore chosen for the main specification instead of the RD approach that leaves two different sets of parameters on the two sides of the treatment cutoff (see Imbens and Lemieux [2008] for a discussion). Table 11 in the Appendix shows result of the latter method too.
18 All cities between 10 and 500 thousand inhabitants. by this issue, while in the FE model time dummies should help clearing out the variation due to such global changes.
Related to the above, a more general point to address is that the enactment of the reform implied not only an increase in autonomy for the cities which obtained certification, but also a decrease in autonomy for the cities which did not (as full powers over education are now clearly assigned to their department). In a sense thus, the untreated municipalities have actually received an 'inverse' treatment. This however constitutes less of a problem in the context of this analysis, as the main goal is to capture the heterogeneity in the effect of autonomy over public education across different levels of local development -rather than exactly quantifying the impact of an increase in autonomy on educational outcomes. Table 3 shows estimation results for the regression discontinuity models (1) and (2), on Mathematics and Spanish student test scores on the 2002-2012 period. In all cases I have excluded from the analysis municipalities of special sizes, namely those below 10 thousand and above 500 thousand inhabitants (municipal categories "Special" and "Sixth" -see footnote 8). The variation in sample sizes across the different quartiles of development depend on the number of municipalities on the left side of the treatment cutoff whose development index belongs to the given range 19 . Column (1) of each panels report the outcome of model (1). The estimate of the average effect of certification in education on municipal test scores is close to zero. Columns (2) to (5) of each panel explore heterogeneities in the effect, considering different subsamples of the 2001 MDI distribution of certified cities: model (1) is applied to the lower and upper 50% development range and to the bottom and top 25% of the range. Looking at the result pattern, a test score gap appears to be opening between the most and the least developed autonomous cities. More specifically, high developed cities who become autonomous do better and low-developed cities do worse than their non-certified counterparts -the effect on the high developed group being larger and more precisely estimated. Table 9 in the Appendix shows that in the pre-reform period (years 2000 and 2001 data) this pattern is not visible, and neither there is any evidence for differential score growth in the different development subsamples. Keeping in mind that test scores are nationally standardized, the postreform bifurcation could arise because certified municipalities change their performance and noncertified ones remain static, or the other way round, or a mix of both effects. As already discussed in section 5.3 though, it is not imperative to the purpose of this paper distinguishing between the two scenarios, and it will suffice to acknowledge that higher amounts of education autonomy are correlated with positive outcomes for high-developed cities, and with rather negative outcomes for low-developed cities.
Results
Regression Discontinuity results
Baseline results
The magnitudes of the effects are sizable, bringing municipal average scores of certified cities around 1.5 points lower than non-certified ones in the least developed quartile, and around 2 points higher for certified than non-certified in the most developed quartile. These convert into -0.15 and +0.2 student standard deviations in scores respectively. The three panels in the first column of Figure 2 depicts these estimation results graphically, focusing on the area of the discontinuity.
Columns (6) in Table 3 show the estimation of model (2), where certification status is linearly interacted with the development percentile to which each municipality belongs, as an alternative way to capture heterogeneity in the effect. This second estimation approach confirms the pattern previously emerged: the effect of certification is increasing in MDI values, starting negative for low MDI values and becoming positive at higher ones.
Consolidation over time
After looking at the average effect on score patterns over the post-reform period 2002-2012, I now concentrate on the years further away from the reform date. Cohorts of high school students taking the Saber 11 exam in later years have been exposed to the reform for a longer time 20 , and one would also expect certified municipalities to need some time adapting to their new powers. Table 4 repeats the estimation of models (1) and (2) 20 Galiani et al. [2008] perform a similar exercise in their paper on Argentinian school decentralization. 21 The effects on Spanish language are smaller and less significant, in line with the common finding in education literature of language scores being less responsive than math scores to education reforms. confidence intervals on the point estimates.
Fixed effects regression results
The results of the fixed effects identification strategy described in Section 5.2 are shown in Table 5 , for both the basic model (3) and the specification that allows for effect heterogeneity in development (4).
The sample is composed of the 30 municipalities closest to the inhabitant cutoff: 19 non-certified ones with more than 80 thousand inhabitants and 11 certified ones with less than 130 thousand inhabitants. The outcome variables are municipal test score averages for the two subjects for the 
Discussion of results
Two different strategies have been employed to isolate the effect of autonomy on quality of education as measured by student test scores, at different levels of municipal development. Both techniques yielded the conclusion that cities at the upper end of the development range benefitted from the acquired autonomy, while those at the lower end did not, or even took loss on it, giving rise to a test score gap between the two groups that appears to be widening over time. The two identification strategies utilize two different types of variation in test score data: variation between certified and non-certified cities for the RD technique and over-time variation within the same city for the FE technique. The fact that quantitatively the results are similar across the two approaches legitimizes the conjecture that driving the result are indeed the certified municipalities that, once acquired autonomy, distanced themselves from their non-certified counterparts (effect captured with RD) and from their own pre-reform results (effect captured with FE) 25 .
In the remaining sections of the paper the focus will lie upon cities in the highest and lowest quartiles of the development range, as these are the two groups on which significant reform effects have been identified. The goal will be exploring these effects in further detail and providing explanations for the test score dynamics shown above.
Compositional effects, migration and public-private education
This section addresses the question of whether the over-time changes in test scores purely reflect changes in student performance (an 'intensive margin' result), or whether the pool of test takers has also been changing as a result of the reform ('compositional effect' or 'extensive margin'). The pool of test takes may change if we observed responses to the reform such as selective migration (into or away from the newly autonomous municipalities), switching of students between public and private schools, or changes in student school dropout patterns. Tables 6 and 7 show regression discontinuity and fixed effects estimations respectively, of student characteristics on the municipal autonomy indicator (certification status). Characteristics being looked at are number of test takers, share of female students, share of students whose mother is low educated (primary school or less) or high educated (at least some post-secondary studies), and the share of students who work while studying. In the RD results, the only statistically significant pattern we are able to spot is some shift of high-educated families away from low-developed municipalities and into high-developed ones, which could suggest some selective migration of the best educated families in our sample. In the FE regressions though, at development ranges which are relevant to certified municipalities (MDI = 29 to 70 approx.), the magnitudes of these shifts seem close to zero. Patterns on low-educated mothers are never statistically significant and the share of working students does not exhibit changes. Overall it seems prudent to conclude that with the available data I am not able to pin down any clear and robust compositional effects on Saber 11 test candidates, as a consequence of the decentralization reform. RD regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status and a third degree population polynomial. Cells show coefficient and standard errors on the certification regressor. The rows refer respectively to: a) All municipalities; b) municipalities in the bottom 25% devlopment range; c) municipalities in the top 25% development range; d) All municipalities, with main effect and development interaction term. SEs clustered by municipalities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The mean of certified municipalities is 1, 947 test takers. Municipal FE regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status. Cells show coefficient and standard errors on the certification regressor. The rows refer respectively to: a) All municipalities; b) All municipalities, with main effect and development interaction term. SEs clustered by municipalities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The absence of significant compositional changes in the pool of test candidates goes in line with one would expect after considering two basic facts about Colombia's school population 26 . The first is the significant and persistent gap between the quality of private and public education. Private schools score substantially and consistently better on standardized tests such as the national ICFES or international PISA results (Cerquera et al. [2000] ; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2012; Gamboa and Waltenberg, 2011) , have smaller class sizes 27 and are four times more likely to offer full-day school programs with respect to public schools, which instead see double the frequency of morning-only or late hours programs ([Bonilla Mejía, 2011] . In sum, it is fair to say that private education in Colombia, as well as in the rest of Latin America, is still a privilege restricted to well-off families (also see Gamboa and Waltenberg [2011] for a discussion). The implementation of a reform that shifts responsibility over public schools from the regional to the municipality level would not be expected to close the gap between public and private education, or to make public institutions significantly more attractive to well-off families. The second fact to keep in mind relates to the first: the family of the typical public-school student in Colombia is less likely to be informed about a decentralization reform occurring, to form strong predictions about its effects on educational quality, or to have the means and opportunity to migrate to a different municipality. 26 In addition to the fact that the publicity of this regime change on mass media has been very limited.
27 Approximately 35 students per teacher in public schools and 25 students per teacher in private schools (averaged over the period 1998-2008). Author's own calculations using national statistics office education data (DANE C-600).
Channels
Expenditure on education
In the pursuit of the reasons behind heterogeneous educational outcomes between high-developed and low-developed autonomous cities, perhaps the most straightforward starting point is expenditure choices. Using detailed balance sheet data 28 of municipalities in the highest and lowest development quartiles, in Table 8 I perform t-tests on the mean expenditures of the two groups over the post-reform period 2002-2012 29 . Central government transfers that municipalities receive to finance education services (SGP Educación) are also compared, as well as the resulting difference between spending and transfers. Spending on education that exceeds government education transfers is covered by municipalities using their own resources, which are represented mainly by local tax and fees collection, and by capital gains 30 .
What emerges from the comparisons performed in Table 8 is that the average per-pupil expenditure by municipalities in the highest development quartile is almost 21% higher than the one of municipalities in the lowest development quartile. Within education expenditure, the difference on personnel salaries is around 12%, up to 28% on school infrastructure and material and as much as 58% higher on other education expenses and programs 31 . The asymmetry in spending is not matched by any asymmetry in central government resources received. In fact, while the low-developed group appears to be spending on education just as much as it receives in education transfers, the high-developed group is integrating transfers with own resources, for around 14% of their total education spending 32 .
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that cities characterized by different levels of development have responded differently to receiving autonomy over the public education service. High developed cities benefit from wealthier populations and higher amounts of own financial resources. In the ten years following the handover of responsibilities, cities in the highest developed quartile have improved their student's test score performance by investing in education more than the ad hoc resources they receive from the central government. Cities in the lowest development quartile instead do not invest more than these transfers. The largest differences in investment shares between the two groups are on "other education programs", which include teacher formation, school transport, planning and maintenance of school information systems and investments into the efficiency of the local education authority itself. Significant spending differences are also found on the infrastructure and school material investments, and on school staff.
I was able to exploit the unusually clean decision rule that was adopted to empower cities with autonomy over education or not: only cities trespassing the 100 thousand inhabitants threshold were made autonomous, and the others put under the authority of their department. Through a regression discontinuity design, I exploited the discontinuous variation in the treatment across cities. Through a fixed-effects strategy I exploited over-time, within-city variation in autonomy.
The two strategies yielded consistent results regarding the effect of city-level autonomy on student test scores, which showed positive for high-developed and negative for low-developed cities, in a trend reinforcing over time. The size of these effects range from 0.15 student standard deviations in the positive direction to 0.13 student standard deviations in the negative direction. Looking at the 8th, 9th and 10th year after the reform only, the effect magnitudes are twice as large. the results of the RD estimation on pre-reform data, in order to verify that the test score patterns and discontinuities identified in the main results were not already existing before the treatment. Again the subsample analysis does not reveal any particular relationship between scores and development before autonomy, while the interaction term specification does show a pattern qualitatively similar to the post-reform scenario but significantly weaker in magnitude. The overall conclusion I draw from the two panels of Table 9 is that before the 2001 decentralization reform, among municipalities sized around 100thousand inhabitants, there was no evident relationship between development measures and student test scores levels or growth rates. That relationship emerged only once cities were endowed with decisional and financial autonomy over the public education service.
13 Financial resources of municipalities 14 Robustness checks 14.1 Regression Discontinuity Estimation 14.1.1 Different polynomials at each side of the cutoff Table 11 replicates the results shown in Table 3 allowing for a different polynomial on each side of the certification cutoff. In econometric terms, this table shows the results of fitting the models Y i = α+τ RD C i +βD i +f (P i )+f (P i )×C i + i and Y i = α+τ RD 0 C i +τ RD 1 C i * D i +βD i +f (P i )+f (P i )×C i + i , where f (P i ) is a third-order polynomial of population P i . The results from the main section are robust to these alternative model specifications. Table of mean annual percapita resources reported by municipalities in pre-and post-reform years (in thousands of Colombian pesos), and percentage differences between the two groups. Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance stars refer to t-tests on the mean differences, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Table 12 shows the results of Table 5 employing different choices of the discontinuity-sample. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
